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2. Darlene Collins, as guardian pro tempore of Vickie Collins, an mcompetent 
person; 
3. Utah State Developmental Center; 
4. Utah State Department of Human Services; and, 
5. State of Utah. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann § 78-2a-3(2)(j). Judge Dennis 
A. Fredrick entered a final order granting the State of Utah's motion for directed verdict 
on July 22, 1998. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on August 21, 1998. On December 
12, 1998, the appeal was transferred from the Supreme Court of Utah to the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Issue: Whether the district court erred when it held that expert testimony was 
required to establish the standard of care, where Collins alleged simple negligence, not 
professional negligence, and where lay jurors could understand the standard of care 
without expert testimony. 
Citation to Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Tr. at 334; Aplt. App. at 107. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews all evidence in the light most favorable to 
Collins, and must reverse the district court's directed verdict unless there was no 
competent evidence to support a verdict for Collins. Merino v. Albertson's. 363 UAR 8, 
8 (Utah February 19, 1999). 
II. Whether the District Court erred in refusing to qualify Dr. Mustard as an 
expert witness, (a) where its refusal was based on a misapplication of law, or 
alternatively, (b) where Dr. Mustard's prior education and experience in risk management 
at comparable facilities qualified him to testify as to the standard of care the Center owed 
to Collins. 
Citation to Record to Preserve Issue (a) on Appeal: Tr. at 334; Aplt. App. at 107. 
Standard of Review: (a) This Court reviews the district court's application of law 
for correctness. Walker v. Union Pacific R. Co.. 844 P.2d 335, 343 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). Exclusion of expert testimony that is based the district court's misapplication of 
law is an abuse of discretion. Id. This Court must reverse if the district court misapplied 
the law when it excluded Dr. Mustard's testimony. 
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Citation to Record to Preserve Issue (b) on Appeal: Tr. at 18-19; Aplt. App. at 81-
82. 
Standard of Review: (b) This Court reviews the district court's exclusion of expert 
testimony for an abuse of discretion. Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993). 
Experts can be qualified to testify based on their experience, and not merely their 
licensure. Id. 
3 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND 
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE 
APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
1. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code. Ann. § 78-14-3; Aplt. App. 
at 120. 
2. 50(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Aplt. App. at 129. 
3. 702 Utah Rules of Evidence; Aplt. App. at 121. 
4. Utah Admin. R. 432-5-(l) through (6); Aplt. App. at 56. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Vickie Collins ("Collins") is a profoundly mentally retarded person. At the time 
of her swing injuries on March 9, 1994, she was forty-one years old, but functioned 
mentally at the level of a three year old. Collins resided at the Utah State Developmental 
Center ("Center") for about twenty-eight years prior to her swing injuries. Collins had a 
lifelong seizure history, and suffered from multiple types of seizures. Collins also 
suffered from schizophrenia. She resided at the Center because her disabilities prevented 
her from being able to care for herself, and she needed help to survive. 
The Center cared for all of Collins' needs. The Center treated her seizures and 
schizophrenia, but also took care of Collins other everyday needs. Among others, those 
needs included Collins' personal hygiene, preparing her meals, and choosing activities 
that were safe for her in light of her limited abilities. 
The Center had protected Collins from seizure injuries in the past. When she 
suffered from seizures in the past, the Center had required her to wear a helmet. The 
Center had also restricted her activities, including swimming and swinging. Since 
reaching the age of majority, Collins has never had a legal guardian. Instead, the Center 
had a limited guardianship to provide Collins with medical treatment. Collins' mother, 
Darlene Collins, was not consulted about the Center's safety measures to protect Collins. 
Darlene trusted the Center to protect Collins because they had reasonably protected her 
from seizure injuries in the past 
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Collins' seizure activity elevated significantly in 1993. The Center's individual 
plan for Collins - the "Individual Habitation Plan," or IHP - noted Collins' elevated 
seizure levels, and recommended follow up medical treatment. The IHP was completed 
less than six months before Collins was paralyzed when she seizured and fell from a 
swing. 
Collins loved to swing. The Center knew that Collins enjoyed swinging, and on 
several occasions, the staff had observed Collins' swing so hard that they were 
"concerned about the height of her swinging." Although the Center was concerned about 
the height of Collins' swinging, the Center was not concerned about the increased risk of 
serious injury if Collins fell from a swing due to a seizure. 
On December 9, 1993, exactly three months to the day before Collins' swing 
accident, she seizured and fell (but not from a swing), and seriously injured her head and 
neck. Because of that injury, the staff decided to make Collins wear a purple football 
helmet when she ambulated. The staff that initiated the helmet idea were not nurses, 
doctors, or mental retardation professionals. Instead, they were Collins' direct care staff 
- lay persons without formal training apart from training they received at the Center. 
Collins continued to seizure. After requiring Collins to wear a helmet, in the three 
months between her December, 1993 injury, and her March, 1994 injury, Collins suffered 
at least ten more seizures witnessed and recorded by the staff. Despite her increased 
seizure activity, and recent seizure injuries, the Center did not modify or restrict any of 
Collins' activities in connection with her increased seizures. It did not occur to the 
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Center that Collins increased the risk of serious injuries if she fell from a swing due to 
seizure. It was undisputed that no staff- professional or non-professional - ever 
considered any modifications to Collins' swinging in connection with her seizures. 
On March 9, 1994, Collins went outside to swing. The swings located next to her 
residence had no restraints to keep riders from falling out ("open swings"). Other swings 
with metal seats, seat backs and handles ("structured swings") were visible from the open 
swings. Collins immediately went to the open swings, and began to swing high. She was 
swinging so high that Becky Jo Kent, Collins' direct staff person, was concerned about 
the height of Collins' swinging, and warned Collins not to swing so high. 
Kent and one other staff were trying to supervise eight residents, including Collins. 
Kent was about fifteen feet from Collins, and was playing ball with another resident 
when she heard a loud "thud." Kent looked over and saw Collins laying on the ground in 
back of the open swings. Collins was not moving. She sustained a burst fracture of her 
seventh thoracic vertebra, and was permanently paralyzed. 
Collins brought a negligence action against the Center in district court. Collins' 
complaint alleged that the Center was negligent because it permitted her to swing in the 
open swings in spite of her increased seizure condition, and that its breach of duty caused 
her paralysis. Collins did not allege any negligence on the part of any individual. 
Nonetheless, Collins complied with the requirements of the Utah Malpractice Act 
because the Center was considered a health care facility under the Act. 
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At trial, the following documents were accepted into evidence in support of 
Collins' case in chief: Collins' IHP; the Center's Client Safety Policy; the Center's 
Seizure - No Swimming List; the Center's seizure records for Collins for both 1993 and 
1994; and, the incident report completed by the Center because of Collins' December, 
1993 seizure fall injury. Collins also put on the testimony of Kent, who testified to the 
facts as outlined above, and that she knew Collins needed help making decisions that 
affected her safety. 
Collins attempted to introduce the testimony of Dr. Lewis Mustard, who was 
Collins' expert witness on the standard of care for care facilities like the Center. The 
district court granted the Center's motion to exclude Dr. Mustard's testimony because it 
concluded that he was not qualified to opine on the standard of care, in spite of his 
education and experience with similar facilities. 
At the close of Collins' case, the Center moved for a directed verdict. The district 
court granted the Center's motion for two reasons: 1) the district court found that because 
Collins' case involved undefined "specialized" medical treatment, expert testimony was 
necessary to establish the applicable standard of care; 2) the district court also concluded 
that Collins had failed to meet her burden of proof because Dr. Mustard was not qualified 
to provide expert testimony, and directed a verdict for the Center. 
Collins appeals the District Court's decision for two reasons. First, it was error to 
require expert testimony to establish the standard of care for a medical malpractice 
action, unless lay jurors could not understand the duty of care owed to Collins. Jurors did 
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not need expert testimony to understand that the Center's failure to even consider the 
need to restrict or modify Collins' swinging was a breach of the Center's duty to 
reasonably protect Collins. The weight of authority shows that in cases where simple 
negligence is at issue, the duty of care, and the breach of that duty are appropriately left 
for lay jurors to decide. 
Second, the district court abused its discretion when it refused to qualify Dr. 
Mustard as an expert witness because: 1) the district court misapplied the law in refusing 
to permit Dr. Mustard's testimony; or, alternatively, 2) Dr. Mustard was qualified to 
provide expert testimony as to the duty of care that the Center owed to Collins. This 
Court should reverse the district court's directed verdict, and remand this case for a new 
trial. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Expert testimony is not required to establish the appropriate standard of care 
in negligence cases unless lay jurors can not understand the duty of care, and breach, 
without expert testimony. Ordinary negligence that arises in health care facilities does 
not automatically require expert testimony. This Court has previously held that no expert 
testimony was required to establish the standard of care applicable to a residential care 
center, where no professional negligence was at issue. Other courts who addressed this 
same issue have held that no expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care 
at facilities like the Center, unless the care at issue is professional medical care, and 
expert testimony is required for jurors to understand the duty of care. In Collins' case, 
the care at issue was the Center's failure to consider the danger of permitting Collins to 
swing in light of her increased seizure level. No professional medical treatment was 
required to consider the danger of serious injury from falling from a swing to a known 
seizure victim like Collins. The district court erred in granting the Center's directed 
verdict, where the care at issue could be understood by lay jurors, and required no expert 
testimony. 
II. The district court abused its discretion in refusing to qualify Dr. Mustard as 
an expert, because it misapplied the law, or failed to acknowledged that Dr. Mustard was 
a qualified expert witness. To the extent that the district court's refusal to permit Dr. 
Mustard's testimony was based on its belief that expert testimony was required in 
Collins' case, it was based on a misapplication of law, and is a per se abuse of discretion. 
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Alternatively, Dr. Mustard was qualified to provide testimony as to the applicable 
standard of care because of his education and experience in risk management as an 
administrator for facilities like the Center. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 9, 1994, Vickie Collins ("Collins") was paralyzed when she fell 
from a swing at the Utah State Developmental Center ("Center). Complaint of Vickie 
Collins; Aplt. App. at 3. 
2. The Center is a intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded 
("ICFMR"), and is licensed by the State of Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 26-21-13.5; Aplt. 
App. at 6. 
3. There are no state or federal standards that mandate the use of swings at 
ICFMRs. 
4. At the time of her fall, Collins was 40 years old and had lived at the Center 
for approximately twenty eight years. Individualized Habitation Plan of Vickie Collins 
(September 16, 1993) [hereinafter: "IHP"]; Aplt. App. at 7. 
5. Collins lived at the Center because she was severely mentally retarded, and 
was unable to care for herself. IHP; Aplt. App. at 7. 
6. Collins suffered from several types of seizures, including grand mal, petit 
mal, and atonic ("sudden drop") seizures. Some of her seizures caused her to fall to the 
ground, while others lasted only moments, and had few observable symptoms. 
Testimony of Becky Jo Kent [hereinafter: "Kent Testimony"], Tr. at 215-220; Aplt. App. 
at 22-27. 
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7. Collins also suffered from schizophrenia. IHP; Aplt. App. at 7. 
8. The Center had provided Collins with comprehensive care for her individual 
needs. Utah Admin. R. 432-15l-(l)-(6); Aplt. App. at 56. For Collins, this care included 
medical care to treat her seizures and schizophrenia. IHP; Aplt. App. at 7. 
9. The Center had a limited guardianship over Collins for the purpose of 
providing her with medical treatment. IHP; Aplt. App. at 7. Collins' mother, Darlene 
Collins, was not Collins' guardian at the time of her injuries. Id. 
9. The Center provided comprehensive life care for Collins. The Center took 
care of Collins' personal hygiene, prepared her meals, and taught her survival and social 
skills. See generally, IHP; Aplt. App. at 7-20. The Center also took Collins on trips 
outside the Center, and provided Collins with recreational activity choices while she was 
at the Center. IHP; Aplt. App. at 8, 10-12, 16 and 18, and Kent Testimony, Tr. at 239-40; 
Aplt. App. at 39-40. 
11. The Center took into account each resident's individualized needs, abilities, 
and limitations, to develop specific individualized plans. See generally. IHP; Aplt. App. 
at 7-20. These plans were called Individual Habitation Plans, or "IHPs." Id. The IHPs 
provided specific treatment objectives and plans for residents' medical, recreational, 
social, dietary, and other needs. Id. 
12. Many of the Center's residents suffered from seizures. Kent Testimony, Tr. 
at 217-218; Aplt. App. at 24-5. The Center staff ("Staff') recorded any seizures they 
witnessed. Id. at 221-22; Aplt. App. at 28-29. 
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13. The Center had a Client Safety Policy for residents who were in danger of 
falling because of seizures, or other reasons. Client Safety Policy: Aplt. App. at 59-60. 
14. The Center also had a Seizure - No Swimming List that prohibited residents 
from swimming under any circumstances if they suffered a major motor seizure within 
three months. Seizure - No Swimming List: Aplt. App. at 61. 
15. On September 16, 1993, the Center completed a new IHP for Collins. IHP: 
Aplt. App. at 7-20. The IHP noted that Collins' seizure medications were being changed, 
and that her seizure activity had recently increased. Id.; Aplt. App. at 17. The IHP 
referred Collins to the Center's seizure clinic. Id.; Aplt. App. at 17. 
16. The IHP acknowledged that Collins had the ability to express her 
preferences to engage in certain activities. IHP ; Aplt. App. at 8. 
17. Collins' IHP also warned that she did not recognize environmental dangers, 
and that she was not traffic safe. IHP ; Aplt. App. at 8 and 18. The Staff knew that 
Collins needed help making decisions about her safety. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 235-36; 
Aplt. App. at 37-38. 
18. Collins' IHP listed swinging among her recommended recreational 
activities. IHP ; Aplt. App. at 11. 
19. After completing Collins' IHP in September, the Center staff witnessed and 
recorded the following seizures for Collins: October, 1993 - 2; November, 1993 - 0; 
December, 1993-3. Utah State Developmental Center Record of Epileptic Seizures for 
Vickie L. Collins (1993); Aplt. App. at 62. 
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20. On December 9, 1993, Collins seizured, fell suddenly, and was injured 
when she hit her head on a cabinet. Utah State Developmental Center Record of 
Epileptic Seizures for Vickie L. Collins (1993); Aplt. App. at 62, an&Incident Report for 
12/9/1993; Aplt. App. at 63, and, Kent Testimony, Tr. at 224-229; Aplt. App. at 31-35. 
21. After Collins9 ground level injury, some members of the Staff thought it 
would be a good idea to require Collins to wear a helmet to protect her when she seizured 
again. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 228-30; Aplt. App. at 34-36. The Staff initiated a drive for 
Collins' helmet, obtained the necessary approvals, and thereafter required Collins to wear 
a helmet when she ambulated. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 228-30 and 247; Aplt. App. at 34-
36, and 47. The helmet was purple, and had a plastic piece over Collins' face to protect 
her if she fell forward. Testimony of Darlene Collins, Tr. at 98; Aplt. App. at 67; and, 
Kent Testimony, Tr. at 246; Aplt. App. at 46. 
22. The Center had undertaken seizure safety measures for Collins during her 
years at the Center. A few years after Collins began living at the Center, the Center 
required Collins to wear a helmet. Testimony of Darlene Collins, Tr. at 93, 97-99; Aplt. 
App. at 65, 66-68. Collins' mother was not consulted about the Center's decision at that 
time. Testimony of Darlene Collins, Tr. at 93, 97-99; Aplt. App. at 65, 66-68. In past 
years, the Center did not allow Collins to swing when she was actively seizuring. 
Testimony of Darlene Collins, Tr. at 97; Aplt. App. at 66. 
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23. Similarly, the Center did not consult Collins5 mother when it required 
Collins to wear the purple helmet just before Collins' injury. Testimony of Darlene 
Collins, Tr. at 98-99; Aplt. App. at 67-68. 
24. Collins wore the purple helmet, and continued to suffer from seizures. The 
Staff recorded ten seizures for Collins between December 9, 1993, when she fell and 
injured her head and neck, and March 9, 1994, the date Collins fell and was paralyzed. 
Utah State Developmental Center Record of Epileptic Seizures for Vickie L. Collins 
(1994); Aplt. App. at 69. 
25. Collins had always enjoyed swinging. Collins was large and strong, and 
would swing very high off the ground. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 252; Aplt. App. at 52. 
Before her injuries, Collins had never fallen off a swing for any reason. Id. at Tr. 253; 
Aplt. App. at 53. 
26. The Staff never considered that Collins might seizure and fall from her 
swing. See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion in Limine (asserting 
that Center's testimony that it linked restrictions on Collins5 swinging to her "human 
rights" should be barred because the Center never considered restricting Collins' 
swinging for any reason); Aplt. App. at 76-77; and Excerpted Arguments of Counsel, 
District Court Rulings and Testimony of Dr. Lewis W. Mustard [hereinafter: "Excerpted 
Arguments, Rulings and Testimony"] ("[T]o say that this was a 'human rights issue' 
when there is no factual basis upon which to come to that conclusion except that it was in 
16 
the back of everyone's mind I think is going somewhat far afield . . . [T]he motion is well 
taken in that regard and I am going to grant it. "); Tr. at 201-02; Aplt. App. at 89-90. 
27. Instead, the Staff was concerned about the height of Collins' swinging, and 
not her seizures. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 252-53; Aplt. App. at 52-53. Accordingly, the 
Staff never considered modifying or restricting Collins' swinging activity in connection 
with her increased seizures. Id. at Tr. 251-52; Aplt. App. at 51-52. 
28. At the time of Collins' injuries, Kent did not know that Collins was 
prohibited from swimming under the Center's Seizure - No Swimming List. Kent 
Testimony, Tr. at 241; Aplt. App. at 41. 
29. At the time of Collins' injuries, Kent thought that the Client Safety Policy 
did not apply to Collins' swinging. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 243-46; Aplt. App. at 43-46. 
Consequently, Kent did not believe that Collins was prohibited from swinging under the 
Policy, or that the Policy required Kent to be attentive and within arm's reach while 
Collins was swinging.. Id., Tr. at 244-45; Aplt. App. at 44-45. 
30. The Center had two types of swings. One type was a single strap of flexible 
material that functioned as a seat, suspended by two chains that hung from a metal 
standard. It had no seat back to keep riders from falling backward, and no front restraint 
to keep riders from falling forward. This type of swing ("open swing") was located 
directly outside Collins residence. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 249; Aplt. App. at 49. 
31. The second type of swing had a metal seat, metal seat back, and metal 
handles, and required riders to climb into it. This second type of swing ("closed swing") 
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was located across a grassy area, and behind a low fence, in view of the open swings next 
to Collins' residence. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 249; Aplt. App. at 49. 
32. On March 9, 1994, Collins and seven other residents went outside to play. 
They were accompanied by two staff members, including Becky Jo Kent ("Kent"). Kent 
Testimony, Tr. at 247; Aplt. App. at 47. Collins was wearing her purple helmet. Id. at Tr. 
246; Aplt. App. at 46. 
33. Collins went immediately to the swings. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 247; Aplt. 
App. at 47. Collins was swinging so high that Kent became concerned for Collins' 
safety, and asked Collins not to swing so high. Id. at Tr. 248, 252-53; Aplt. App. at 48, 
52-53. Kent did not prevent Collins from continuing to swing, or offer to let Collins 
swing on the closed swings. Id. at Tr. 252; Aplt. App. at 52. 
34. Kent was playing "talking and playing ball" with another client, and was not 
watching Collins. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 248; Aplt. App. at 48. Kent was standing 
approximately ten to fifteen feet away from Collins. Id., Tr. at 253-54; Aplt. App. at 53-
54. 
35. Collins seizured, briefly lost consciousness, and fell from the swing. 
Testimony of Dr. Dennis J. Wyman, Tr. at 167-69; Aplt. App. at 115-17. 
36. Kent heard a loud "thud," and looked over toward Collins, who was lying 
on the ground in back of the swing set. Kent Testimony, Tr. at 248; Aplt. App. at 48. 
37. No one saw the height from which Collins fell, but Collins landed with such 
force that she sustained a burst fracture of her seventh thoracic vertebra when she hit the 
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ground. Testimony of Dr. Dennis J. Wyman, Tr. at 165-66; Aplt. App. at 113-14. 
Collins5 fall caused her to be permanently paralyzed. Id., Tr. at 166; Aplt. App. at 114. 
38. Collins' life care planner, Stephen Anderson, testified that paraplegics like 
Collins typically suffer from bladder infections, bowel impaction, problems with 
contractures and decubitus ulcers (pressure sores), as well as mobility problems from 
being unable to walk. Testimony of Stephen Anderson, Tr. at 305; Aplt. App. at 119. 
39. Collins' Complaint alleged that the Center was negligent, and did not allege 
professional negligence of a particular individual or specialist. Complaint of Vickie 
Collins; Aplt. App. at 3-4. 
40. Collins complied with the requirements of the Utah Medical Malpractice 
Act (the "Act") because the Center is considered a "health care facility" under the Act, 
which applies to all tort actions against health care facilities, even if no professional 
malpractice is alleged. Utah Code Ann § 78-14-3(11) and (14); Aplt. App. at 120. 
41. At trial, Collins' witnesses included Darlene Collins, Sherrie Carroll, Becky 
Jo Kent, Steve Anderson - a life care planner, and Dr. Lewis Mustard. All witnesses 
testified except Dr. Mustard. 
42. Collins tried to present expert testimony from Dr. Lewis Mustard, Ph.D. 
Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 274; Aplt. App. at 91. Dr. Mustard 
held a Ph.D in Health Administration, among his many degrees and certificates. 
Curriculum Vitae of Lewis Williams Mustard: Aplt. App. at 122. Dr. Mustard taught 
numerous courses and seminars in the areas of health care management and 
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administration, as an adjunct professor. Id.; Aplt. App. at 123-24, 126-27. Dr. Mustard 
had twenty-five years of professional experience in the area of hospital administration. 
Id.; Aplt. App. at 123. Dr. Mustard served as an administrator over an intermediate care 
facility for the mentally retarded - the same type of facility as the Center. Excerpted 
Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 279; Aplt. App. at 93. Dr. Mustard 
specifically dealt with risk management and safety issues at that facility. Excerpted 
Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 280; Aplt. App. at 94. Dr. Mustard also 
managed nursing homes and a retirement care center in the area of patient care 
management. Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 282; Aplt. App. at 96. 
Dr. Mustard had also testified in several facility negligence cases similar to Collins' case. 
Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 282; Aplt. App. at 96. 
43. Dr. Mustard was prepared to testify as to risk management standards that 
were applied at comparable facilities, including care facilities for disabled residents, 
hospitals, and nursing homes. Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 285; 
Aplt. App. at 97. 
44. The Center objected to Dr. Mustard testifying as an expert witness. 
Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 15-24; Aplt. App. at 79-88. See 
generally. 702 Utah Rules of Evidence; Aplt. App. at 121. After voir dire examination, 
the district court granted the Center's motion. Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and 
Testimony, Tr. at 293-95; Aplt. App. at 101-03. 
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45. At the close of Collins' case, the Center moved for a directed verdict. 
Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 331; Aplt. App. at 104. See 
generally, 50(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Aplt. App. at 129. The district court 
concluded that Collins' case involved "specialized" medical treatment, and required 
expert testimony to establish the standard of care, and a breach of that standard. 
Excerpted Arguments, Rulings and Testimony, Tr. at 337; Aplt. App. at 110. The district 
court, however, did not articulate what "specialized" care it believed was at issue, which 
required expert testimony. Id. The district court granted the Center's directed verdict. 
Id. On July 22, 1998, the district court signed its order that granted the Center's directed 
verdict. 
46. On August 18, 1998, notice of the signed order was filed in district court. 
On August 21, 1998, Collins filed a notice of appeal. On September 30, 1998, the district 
court entered an order and judgment granting the Center's costs against Collins. On 
December 12, 1998, the Supreme Court of Utah assigned this case to the Court of 
Appeals of the State of Utah. 
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ARGUMENT 
I THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DIRECTED A VERDICT FOR 
THE CENTER BECAUSE NO EXPERT TESTIMONY IS REQUIRED TO 
ESTABLISH THE STANDARD OF CARE IN A NEGLIGENCE CASE 
UNLESS THE CARE OF A SPECIFIC PROFESSIONAL IS AT ISSUE. 
A This Court Must Review The Evidence In The Light Most Favorable To 
Collins. And Must Reverse The District Court Unless No Reasonable 
Person Could Find That The Center Breached Its Duty To Collins. 
This Court must review the facts in the light most favorable to Collins. The 
Supreme Court has held that, "A trial court is justified in granting a directed verdict only 
if, examining all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no 
competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non-moving party's favor." 
Merino v. Albertsons. Inc.. 363 Utah Adv. Rep 8, 8 (Utah February 19,1999) (emphasis 
added). This Court has held that a directed verdict is only appropriate "when reasonable 
minds could not differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence presented." 
Olympus Hills Center. Ltd.. v. Smiths Food and Drug Centers. Inc.. 889 P.2d 445, 450 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994)(citations omitted). 
Negligence issues are generally not susceptible to summary adjudication, either for 
or against claimants. See, e^ g,, English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) ("summary judgment should be granted with great caution where negligence is 
alleged . . . . [accordingly, summary judgment is reserved for only the most clear-cut 
negligence cases.") (citations omitted), affd on other grounds. 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993); 
and Swann v. Len-Care Rest Home. Inc.. 490 S.E.2d 572, 574 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) 
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(reversing directed verdict where 98 year old plaintiff showed that rest home knew of 
need to restrain her from standing because of her propensity to fall when trying to stand 
up). Consequently, this Court must reverse the district court if there was competent 
evidence to support a verdict for Collins. 
B Expert Testimony Is Only Required In Medical Malpractice Cases Where 
Professional Medical Care Is At Issue. And Where Lav Jurors need Expert 
Testimony to Understand the Appropriate Duty of Care. 
Utah law does not require expert testimony in medical malpractice cases unless the 
plaintiff puts professional negligence at issue, and then, only if lay jurors can not 
understand the appropriate standard of care without expert testimony. As a threshold 
matter, Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not require plaintiffs to present 
expert testimony to establish a prima facie case of negligence. Instead, the Rule permits 
expert witnesses to testify if "technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence, or to understand a fact in issue." Utah R. Evid. 
702; Aplt App. at 121. The law of whether expert witnesses are required in negligence 
cases is found in the common law. This Section sets forth the applicable law to 
Collins'case. 
First, expert witnesses are generally required in classic medical malpractice cases 
where professional negligence is alleged. There are, however, exceptions that apply to 
Collins' case. Expert testimony is not required cases where lay jurors can understand the 
applicable standard of care, even where professional negligence is alleged. In addition, 
no expert testimony is required where plaintiffs do not allege professional negligence. 
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Finally, applying the law to Collins' case, Collins' complaint, along with the evidence at 
trial, put the Center's risk management practices, or lack thereof, squarely at issue.1 The 
evidence showed that the Center - not any specific individuals - had the duty to 
reasonably protect Collins from harm in light of her seizures. Nonetheless, the district 
court concluded that the Center had provided "specialized" health care services to 
Collins, and therefore required Collins to present expert testimony to establish the 
standard of care and breach of that standard. The district court's directed verdict must be 
reversed because no expert testimony was required to establish that the Center breached 
its duty to reasonably protect Collins in light of her seizures. 
1 Although Expert Testimony is Generally Required in Medical 
Malpractice Cases, An Exception Applies to Collins' Case: No 
Expert Testimony is Required When Lay Jurors Can Understand 
the Standard of Care Without Expert Testimony. 
The weight of authority shows that expert testimony is only required in medical 
malpractice cases where professional medical care is at issue. Expert testimony is 
generally required to establish the standard of care owed to the plaintiff where specific 
professional medical care is at issue. See, e.g.. Chadwick v. Nielson. 763 P.2d 817, 821, 
n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding that standard of care must be established by expert 
1
 Collins brought a facility negligence action, and did not allege any professional 
negligence. Facts ^ f 1. The district court simply ignored Collins' theory of the case, and 
converted it into a professional negligence action. This is especially troublesome because the 
district court failed to explain exactly what "specialized" health care was at issue, and why it 
required expert testimony. Facts % 45. The facts show that the Center had a duty of care to 
reasonably protect Collins, as opposed to any particular professional. See discussion infra, at Part 
IC. 
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medical testimony to present prima facie medical malpractice case involving doctor 
negligence). This general rule, however, is subject to important exceptions that apply to 
Collins' case. 
Expert testimony is not required to establish the appropriate standard of care if lay 
jurors can understand the standard of care without expert testimony - even where 
professional medical treatment is at issue. Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 
1980) (holding expert testimony not required to establish standard of care when needle 
left in patient after surgery). The Nixdorf Court explained that where the "propriety of 
the treatment received is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman, 
expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the professional standard of care." Id. at 
352. In another words, expert testimony is only necessary where professional medical 
care is at issue and the proper standard of care can not be ascertained by lay jurors 
without the help of expert testimony. Cases involving professional negligence may 
require expert testimony from a professional to understand the applicable duty of care, 
but simple negligence cases generally require no expert testimony to establish a prima 
facie case.2 In this case, no breach of professional duty was alleged, and lay jurors could 
understand the Center's duty to act reasonably under the circumstances. 
2
 For the purpose of this Brief, "simple negligence" will refer to the negligent acts of 
non-professionals whose duty requires no expert testimony because the duty of care can be 
understood by lay jurors. In contrast, "professional negligence" will refer to a breach of the 
standard of care owed by a particular professional to a tort victim, whose duty may require expert 
testimony for jurors to understand the duty of care. 
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2 Negligence in Health Care Facilities That Involves Non-
Professional Care Requires No Expert Testimony. 
Negligence in health care facilities does not always involve professional medical 
care. Under Utah law, any action, including any tort - negligent or otherwise -
committed by any "health care provider" is deemed a "medical malpractice" action. Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14).3 Because "medical 
malpractice" actions include all torts committed by health care providers, the duty of care 
must be determined by first examining whether professional conduct is at issue. As one 
court stated, "Not all injuries that occur in a hospital, nursing home, or other health care 
facility are a result of professional negligence; they may be solely attributable to ordinary 
or simple negligence." Moore v. Lewis Smith Memorial Hosp., Inc., 454 S.E.2d 190, 
191 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that injury suffered while plaintiff was moved from 
wheelchair to bed in health care facility was ordinary negligence, and not medical 
malpractice). 
3
 The Act expansively defines a "malpractice action against a health care provider" 
as "any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, 
wrongful death, or otherwise . ..." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14); Aplt. App. at 120. Collins 
does not dispute that the Act applies to her case. Instead, Collins disputes that expert testimony 
is required because the Act applies to her case. Under Utah law, "medical malpractice" actions 
need not involve professional negligence, and accordingly, need not require expert testimony to 
establish the duty of care. 
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3 The Facts Show That The Center's Failure To Reasonably 
Protect Collins Was At Issue, And Not The Care Of Any 
Particular Professional. 
Collins brought a simple negligence action against the Center - not a professional 
malpractice action. Collins' Complaint alleged no professional negligence. Facts If 1. 
Instead, Collins alleged that the Center, and not a particular professional, owed her a duty 
of care which was breached and proximately caused her to be paralyzed. Id. The facts 
showed that no particular staff- professional or non-professional - had the specific duty 
to consider Collins' safety in light of her increased seizures, her recent seizure injury, and 
her habit of swing at dangerous heights. Facts fflf 8-11. The district court simply 
ignored Collins' facility negligence theory, and erred when it concluded that expert 
testimony was required, because the Collins never put the conduct of any particular 
professional at issue.4 
In Collins' case, this Court must focus on the care at issue, and not merely where it 
happened, to determine whether expert testimony was required to establish the Center's 
duty of care to reasonably protect Collins. See, e.g., Beverly Enterprise-Virginia, Inc., 
T/A, Etc. v. Nichols, 441 S.E.2d 1 (Va. 1994) (holding no expert testimony required to 
4
 The district court apparently believed that expert testimony was required because 
the Center delegated some of Collins5 care to a treatment team made of professionals and non-
professionals, even though no professional - or non-professional - had this specific duty to 
reasonably protect Collins in light of her increased seizures. The district court's conclusion that 
expert testimony was required establishes an obtuse and unworkable precedent for tort victims 
trying to establish the duty of care in cases like Collins'. See discussion infra, at Part ID. 
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establish negligence of nursing home where patient choked on food and died, and whose 
employees failed to assist patient with eating who had a history of choking problems); 
and, Williamson v. Provident Group. Inc.. 550 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Neb. 1996) (affirming 
refusal for directed verdict because no expert testimony required in slip and fall case 
involving assisted care facility where no professional negligence alleged), rev'd. on other 
grounds. 
Collins' position is consistent with Utah law. In Virginia S. v. Salt Lake Care 
Center. 741 P.2d 969 (Utah Ct App. 1987), this Court required no expert testimony to 
establish the standard of care applicable to a nursing home injury. In that case, a 
mentally and physically incapacitated seventeen year old girl was raped while under the 
care and custody of the defendant. Id at 972. The trial court refused to permit plaintiffs 
obstetrician's testimony because he lacked "sufficient experience with nursing homes to 
qualify as an expert on the standard of care applicable to nursing homes." Id This Court 
held that "[T]he degree of care which a nursing home owes to its patients is similar to that 
owed by a hospital to its patients." Id. (citation omitted). This Court further held that it 
was the "duty of the nursing home to provide a reasonable standard of care taking into 
account the patients' mental and physical condition." Id (citation omitted). 
Similarly, the Center must be held to the standard of reasonable care under the 
circumstances, including Collins' profound retardation, her inability to understand 
hazardous conditions, her heightened seizure level, and the fact that she had recently been 
injured when she fell from a seizure. Negligent health care facilities may not be shielded 
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from simple negligence actions simply because the statute identifies them as "medical 
malpractice actions." Instead, courts must carefully examine the care at issue to 
determine whether expert testimony is necessary in each case. 
The district court failed to critically examine the specific duty of care owed to 
Collins. Although the district court admitted that Collins' case was "not a classic medical 
malpractice case," it did not explain why not. Facts % 42. Put simply, Collins' case was 
not a "classic medical malpractice case" because Collins alleged no professional 
negligence. Also, while the district court concluded that the case "clearly involved the 
providing of health care services, which [were] specialized in nature," it failed to identify 
which particular health care service(s) were at issue. Id. The district court's failure to 
identify the care at issue was especially vexing for two reasons: 1) there was no way to 
divine whether the district court understood what particular duty of care was at really at 
issue; and 2) the district court assumed - without explanation - that lay jurors could not 
understand that duty of care (whatever it was) without expert testimony.5 
This Court must reverse the district court because its conclusions about the 
requirement of expert testimony were not supported by the facts, or alternatively, against 
the weight of authority which required the court to examine the specific duty at issue in 
determining when expert testimony is required. 
5
 Given the standard of review for directed verdicts, that no reasonable juror could 
find for the plaintiff, see discussion supra at Part IA, the district court abused its discretion by 
failing to explain the factual basis for its legal conclusions. 
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C No Expert Testimony Was Required To Show That The Center Owed 
Collins The Duty To Reasonably Protect Her From Harm Because of Its 
Special Relationship to Collins. The Center's Safety Policies. Collins' 
Individual Habitation Plan, and Common Sense. 
Jurors needed no expert testimony to understand that the Center breached its duty 
to reasonably protect Collins from harm in light of her seizures. The Center owed Collins 
a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances that were established by the facts on 
the record. The Center's duty to reasonably protect Collins arose from specific facts that 
were part of the district court record: 1) the Center had a "special relationship" to Collins 
because of her vulnerability and inability to protect herself; 2) the Center's own safety 
policies; 3) Collins' Individualized Habitation Plan; and, 4) applying common sense to 
the facts that were reasonably apparent to all staff- professional or not. The facts also 
demonstrated that the Center breached its duty because the Center never even considered 
restricting or modifying Collins' swinging in light of her increased seizures. Facts Tfl[ 26-
27. No expert testimony was required for jurors to understand that the Center should 
have considered restricting or modifying Collins' swinging until her seizures were better 
controlled. This Court should reverse the district court's grant of the Center's motion for 
directed verdict because no expert testimony was required to understand the standard of 
care and the Center's breach of that duty to Collins. 
1 The Center Owed Collins The Duty To Protect Her From Harm 
Because Of Its Special Relationship To Collins. 
The Center owed Collins a duty to protect her from harm. Generally, there is no 
affirmative duty to protect another from harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314. 
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Where the defendant stands in a "special relationship" to the victim, however, the 
defendant has an affirmative duty to protect the victim from harm. Beach v. University of 
Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A,6 
with approval). The Supreme Court explained that "[Special] relationships generally 
arise when one assumes responsibility for another's safety " Id According to the 
Beach court, "The essence of a special relationship is dependence by one party upon the 
other...." WL at 417 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).7 Collins' dependency on the 
Center gave rise to the Center's duty to reasonably protect her during her seizures. 
Collins' case presents the paradigm of a special relationship. For thirty years, the 
Center helped Collins with nearly every facet of her life. Notably, the Center helped 
Collins take her seizure and schizophrenia medications. Facts ^ 8. The Center provided 
Collins with choices for recreational activities. Facts f 10. The Center also supervised 
Collins' traffic safety when she went on outings. Facts 1f 17. Given Collins' severe 
mental retardation, schizophrenia, and seizure history, and the Center's comprehensive 
6
 That section states in pertinent part: 
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the 
custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the 
other of his normal opportunities for protection is under a similar 
duty to the other. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4). 
7
 In the Beach case, the court found that the University of Utah had no special 
relationship to Beach that gave rise to a duty to protect Beach from falling and injuring herself on 
a University outing where she got drunk. Id at 420. 
31 
care for Collins' needs, the facts show that the Center had a special relationship to 
Collins, and owed Collins a duty to protect her from harm. 
Other courts have held that care providers like the Center have a duty to 
affirmatively protect profoundly disabled persons like Collins. Hammack v. Lutheran 
Soc. Svs. of Michigan, 535 NW.2d 215 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), is nearly identical to 
Collins' case. In Hammack the court found that a special relationship existed between a 
developmentally disabled individual, who had a history of seizures, and an independent 
living home for the developmentally disabled. Id. at 217. In Hammack the client 
drowned from a seizure while bathing. Id. The client was a thirty-year-old, mildly 
retarded, developmentally disabled man, living in a semi-independent living home for the 
developmentally disabled. Id at 216. The defendants argued that due to the emphasis 
placed on plaintiffs becoming more independent, it did not have the level of control over 
him that gave rise to a duty to monitor the plaintiff while he bathed. Id at 217.8 The 
court found that under the circumstances of that case, where the plaintiff had "entrusted 
himself to the control and protection of defendant," that defendant had a special 
relationship to plaintiff, and owed the plaintiff a duty of care to protect him from harm. 
8
 The Center tried to make similar arguments about Collins' human rights and the 
dignity of risk in connection with Collins' right to swing. The district court recognized, however, 
that having failed to ever consider restricting Collins' swinging in connection with her seizures, 
the Center was barred from introducing any such evidence at trial and granted part of Plaintiffs 
Motion in Limine. Facts If 26. 
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Id. Like the Hammack court, this Court should find that Collins entrusted her protection 
and control to the Center, and that the Center had a duty to protect Collins. 
This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict because jurors could 
have understood the Center's duty to reasonably protect Collins under the facts of this 
case. Collins' dependency on the Center gave rise to its duty to reasonably protect her 
from harm. There was no need for expert testimony because the facts that gave rise to the 
Center's duty could be understood by lay jurors. 
2 The Center Also Owed Collins the Duty to Protect Her Under Its 
own Policies and By Applying Common Sense to Protect Collins. 
A The Center's Client Safety Policy Prohibited Collins from 
Swinging or From Swinging Without A Staff Member Within 
Arm's Reach. 
The Center's own policies established a duty to reasonably protect Collins. As a 
preliminary matter, the Center had no fall prevention policy in place at the time of 
Collins' injuries. The failure to have a fall prevention policy may be considered evidence 
of the Center's negligence. Even without a fall prevention policy, however, the Center's 
other policies gave rise to its duty to protect Collins at the time of her injuries. 
The Center had a duty to protect Collins under its Client Safety Policy. The Client 
Safety Policy states that "Staff shall be safety-conscious to prevent the creation of unsafe 
conditions and alert for existing conditions which could cause an accident." Facts f 13. 
The staff had an affirmative duty under the Safety Policy to consciously prevent unsafe 
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conditions that could cause accidents.9 This is consistent with the Center's duty to 
protect its severely disabled residents who are unable to identify hazards associated with 
particular activities, and need help making decisions about their own safety. Whether the 
open swing constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition to a severely retarded 
person, who loved to swing, and was then suffering from frequent drop seizures, and had 
recently been injured such a fall, is a fact-specific question for lay jurors to decide. This 
Court should reverse the district court's directed verdict because Collins stated a prima 
facie case of ordinary negligence for maintaining an unreasonably dangerous condition. 
Even apart from the dangerous condition issue, the Policy also required a staff 
member to be within arm's reach while Collins was swinging. Under the Policy, Collins 
should have been within arms reach of a staff member if she was in an area where she 
was in danger of falling: 
A client whom the treatment team determines to be incapable of 
independent action, will not be left unattended by staff [ i n ] . . . areas 
where falling . . . may occur. One staff should be in arms reach of 
the client under these conditions and other staff should not distract 
this attendant. 
Aplt. App. at 59. By its terms, the Safety Policy applies to clients who are not capable of 
"independent action." 
9
 The Center had a separate duty to maintain a reasonably safe premises. See, e.g.. 
Hammack. 535 N.W.2d at 217, (failing to properly monitor tub was unreasonably dangerous 
condition for retarded seizure victim who drowned)(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343, 
with approval). 
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The Safety Policy applied to Collins because clients who are truly capable of 
"independent action" can evaluate hazards and risks. Conversely, Collins could not 
evaluate the hazards of swinging in her condition. At trial, staff member Becky Jo Kent 
("Kent") testified that "independent action" merely referred to a client's physical ability 
to do an activity, or to choose to do a specific activity. Tr. at 244-46. Kent's 
understanding of the Safety Policy was flawed, because under her reasoning, no client 
who was capable of expressing an activity preference or initiating an activity was covered 
by the Safety Policy. Instead, the Safety Policy applied to clients who could not evaluate 
hazards and risks because the Center puts the responsibility of preventing unsafe 
conditions squarely on its staff. Aplt. App. at 59-60. Kent should have been within 
arm's reach and fully attentive to Collins if Kent permitted Collins to swing. 
This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict because the Center's 
policies and the facts of this case present a prima facie case of negligence that could be 
understood by a lay juror. The Client Safety Policy should have prevented Collins from 
swinging in the open swing because her seizure level made it an "unsafe condition that 
could cause an accident." Alternatively, assuming arguendo that the swing was not an 
unreasonably dangerous condition to Collins, she should have been within arm's reach of 
an attentive staff member while swinging, not fifteen feet away from a staff who is 
monitoring eight clients at once. These duties present fact-based issues that are 
understandable to lay jurors. For these reasons, this Court should reverse the district 
court's directed verdict, and remand this case for a new trial. 
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B The Center's Seizure Clinic No Swimming List Supports 
Application of the Client Safety Policy to Collins 
Any doubt about whether the Safety Policy applied to Collins was answered 
affirmatively by considering the Center's other seizure policies. The Center's own 
"Seizure Clinic - No Swimming Lisf restricted Collins from swimming at the time of her 
injuries because of her increased seizures. Under that Policy, clients who have 
experienced a major motor seizure are not allowed to swim within three months of the 
seizure. Facts If 14. Kent claimed that the Client Safety Policy did not apply to Collins' 
swinging because she associated the Policy with "bathing, changing tables, bath tubs. 
showers, drowning, lids, falling . ..." Tr. at 244; Aplt. App. at 44; (emphasis added). If 
Kent associated the Client Safety Policy with "bathing, bath tubs, showers, drowning," 
and especially "falling," she should have reasonably looked at the No Swim List to 
resolve any questions about whether the Client Safety Policy applied to Collins' 
swinging. At the time of Collins' injuries, however, Kent admitted that she did not know 
that Collins was prohibited from swimming because of her seizures. Facts % 28. The 
facts show that the staff did not understand the Center's own policies to protect its 
residents. 
Lay jurors could understand the Center's duty of care under its own policies. 
Taken together, the Center's Seizure Clinic No Swimming Policy and the Client Safety 
Policy, illustrate the Center's duty of care to reasonably protect Collins by prohibiting her 
from swinging while her seizure frequency was elevated. This Court should reverse the 
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district court's directed verdict because no expert testimony is required to understand the 
duties that arose under these policies. 
C The Center Breached Its Duty to Collins By Failing to Act 
Reasonably In Light of Collins' Individualized Habitation 
Plan. 
Lay jurors could understand that Collins' Individualized Habitation Plan ("IHP") 
reasonably required the Center to consider modifying or restricting Collins' swinging 
during her increased seizure period. The information contained in the IHP alerted the 
Center to Collins' seizure activity, her inability to recognize dangers, and her swinging. 
The IHP states that "[Collins] requires supervision because she is not traffic safe, nor 
does she recognize environmental dangers." Facts f 17; Aplt. App. at 8; (emphasis 
added). The IHP also states that "[Collins] can swing and use playground equipment." 
Id.; Aplt. App. at 11. Under a section entitled "PRIORITIZED NEEDS," the IHP states 
that "[Collins] needs to have her seizure condition monitored and controlled with 
medications." Id.; Aplt. App. at 13; (bold and capitals in original). The section entitled 
"SERVICE OBJECTIVES," reads: 
1-S. SEIZURE DISORDER:... This past year [Collins] was 
tapered off Tranxzene and did well on monotherapy of 
Tegretol. In reviewing records, it is noted that [Collins] has 
had a recent increase in seizure activity. She will be referred 
to seizure clinic. 
Id.; Aplt. App. at 17; (bold and capitals in original)(underline added). All of the 
information needed to reasonably alert the Center to the danger of failing to consider 
modifications or restrictions to Collins' swinging was contained in Collins' IHP. 
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The Center had a duty to consider Collins' IHP in structuring her activities. The 
Center was required to take into account Collins' individual needs in determining 
appropriate leisure activities. Facts f 10. The Center should have reasonably examined 
Collins' leisure activities in connection with her increased seizures. Instead, the Center 
failed to take any action to prevent Collins from suffering foreseeable injuries. Facts f26. 
This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict because jurors could have 
understood the Center's duty to reasonably protect Collins, and its breach of that duty on 
the facts presented at trial. 
D Common Sense Required the Staff to Consider the Danger to 
Collins of Permitting Her to Swing While Her Seizure 
Activity Was High. 
Lay jurors could understand that the Center owed Collins the duty to use common 
sense to restrict or modify her swinging while her seizure activity was high. The Center 
had the duty to provide Collins with safe leisure choices that took into account her 
increased seizure activity. Facts % 10. Kent understood that Collins did not fully 
appreciate dangers and risks, and admitted that Collins needed help to make decisions 
that affected her health and safety. Facts 117. Kent nonetheless claimed that she used 
common sense in deciding to let Collins swing on the date of her injuries. Tr. at 254-55; 
Aplt. App. at 54-55. The Center owed Collins a duty of common sense to provide her 
with leisure choices that were reasonably safe in light of her seizures. Whether the 
Center used sufficient common sense under these facts, however, is a fact-specific jury 
question. 
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The Center had already used common sense to protect Collins by making her wear 
a helmet. The staff understood that Collins5 seizure activity was high, and that she had 
already injured herself in a seizure-related fall. Both Kent, and her Program Lead, 
Sherrie Robb, initiated the idea of Collins wearing a helmet to protect her because they 
reasonably anticipated that Collins would seizure, fall, and hurt herself again. Facts 1f2l. 
Neither Kent nor Robb are nurses, doctors, or mental retardation professionals10 - they 
simply acted out of common sense to protect Collins. 
Although the Center used some common sense in requiring Collins to wear a 
helmet, it also should have considered the risks associated with Collins' recreational 
activities.11 Common sense dictates that persons like Collins will increase the risk of 
serious injury if they seizure and fall while swinging, as opposed to a ground level fall.12 
The Center used common sense to recognize that it was dangerous for Collins to swing so 
high. Facts [^27. Despite Collins' recent injuries, and the required purple football helmet, 
10
 Neither the position of Developmentalist (Kent), nor Program Lead (Robb), 
requires any professional licensure. 
11
 The Center could have discharged its duty to use common sense to reasonably 
protect Collins in several ways: It could have restricted Collins' use of the open swings until her 
seizure activity was better controlled; it could have limited Collins' swinging to the closed swings 
to minimize the risk of her falling if she seizured; it could have followed its own Client Safety 
Policy and prevented Collins from using the open swings unless an attentive staff member was 
within arm's reach. At minimum, the duty of reasonableness under the circumstances required the 
Center to take into account the danger to Collins if she seizured while swinging, but the Center 
failed to even consider the danger to Collins if she seizured and fell from the open swings. 
12
 Collins hit the ground so hard when she fell, that her seventh vertebrae blew apart, 
and one of the fragments came backward into her spinal cord, causing paralysis. Facts ft? 7. 
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however, the Center failed to connect Collins' high swinging and the risk of falling if she 
seizured. Lay jurors could understand that letting Collins swing in an open swing during 
her increased seizure period could cause Collins to be seriously injured if she seizured 
and fell. No expert testimony was required to understand the Center's duty to use 
common sense to reasonably protect Collins. 
This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict because lay jurors 
could understand and apply the Center's duty of common sense to reasonably protect 
Collins, and understand the Center's breach of that duty under the facts presented at trial. 
D. This Court Should Reverse the District Court's Ruling Because It 
Establishes An Ambiguous and Burdensome Precedent For Tort Victims In 
Facility Negligence Actions. 
This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict because it conflicts 
with established Utah law in simple negligence actions, and establishes unreasonable 
barriers to compensation for tort victims. As shown above, Utah law requires expert 
testimony only where professional negligence is at issue, and lay jurors can not 
understand the duty of care without expert testimony. See discussion supra, at Part IB. 
In this case, the district court concluded that expert testimony was required, even though 
no professional negligence was alleged, and the district court made no factual finding as 
to which professional duty it believed was at issue. This Court should not permit the 
district court's ruling to stand because it creates confusion and unreasonable obstacles to 
compensating Utah's tort victims, and shields tortfeasors from responsibility. 
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The district court's ruling requires tort victims to present expert testimony to 
recover in simple negligence actions. This would increase the costs, delays, and 
complexity of simple negligence actions. Conversely, the ruling provides no guidance as 
to what expert testimony is necessary under facility negligence cases, where a team 
provides interdisciplinary treatment to the tort victim. Plaintiffs will be forced to use a 
"shotgun" approach, and engage a team of expert witnesses to account for each member 
of the interdisciplinary team. Alternatively, even assuming that hiring a team of experts 
is not required by the district court's ruling, plaintiffs may still have to engage numerous 
experts before courts decide which expert can testify as to the duty of care at issue. This 
Court must reverse the district court's ruling because it establishes a confusing and 
dangerous precedent for victims of simple facility negligence. 
The district court's ruling must also be reversed because it undermines established 
Utah legal precedent. As noted above, the ruling is contrary to the weight of authority, 
under both Utah law, and the laws of other jurisdictions. As a consequence, the ruling 
could spawn significant litigation as courts try to define the limits of "specialized medical 
treatment," in the context of facility negligence cases. The ruling would shield tortfeasor 
facilities from simple negligence actions because they can hide simple negligence behind 
a team of professionals and non-professionals. The ruling also undermines the jury 
system because it assumes that jurors can not understand the duty of care in simple 
negligence actions if they arise at "health care facilities." 
41 
For the policy reasons set forth above, this Court must reverse the district court's 
directed verdict, and remand this case for a new trial. 
42 
II THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
REFUSED TO PERMIT COLLINS' EXPERT WITNESS TO TESTIFY AS 
TO THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE FOR THE CENTER 
This Court must reverse the district court's refusal to permit Collins' expert 
witness to testify. Although district courts have discretion to determine the qualifications 
of expert witnesses, that discretion is abused where the court's refusal is based on a 
misapplication of law. Alternatively, the district court abuses its discretion where the 
expert witness is qualified to assist the jury in understanding the evidence or facts in 
issue, and the court refuses to permit that testimony. 
A. The District Court Abused Its Discretion Because Its Refusal To Permit 
Was Based On A Misapplication of Law. 
This Court must reverse district court's refusal to permit Collins' expert witness to 
testify because the court's refusal was based on legal error, and is not entitled to 
deference. It is an abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony where the exclusion is 
based on a misperception of the law. Walker v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.. Inc.. 844 P.2d 335, 
343 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). This is because the district court can not properly exercise its 
discretion where its exclusion is based on a legal misconception. Gaw v. State of Utah. 
798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert denied, 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Utah 
1990). 
The district court erroneously believed that expert testimony was required to 
establish the duty of care that the Center owed to Collins. Collins has shown that no 
expert testimony was required because no specific professional conduct was at issue. To 
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the extent that any professional conduct was at issue, expert testimony was not required 
because the Center's negligence in failing to even consider the increased risk of injury to 
Collins from seizuring while swinging was apparent to lay jurors. See discussion supra, 
at Part IC. 
If this Court determines, however, that expert testimony was necessary, it must 
reverse the district court's refusal to permit Collins' expert witness to testify because it 
was based on legal error and was therefore an abuse of discretion. 
E, Collins' Witness Was Qualified To Testify As An Expert On The Duty Of 
Care That The Center Owed To Collins. 
This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict because its refusal to 
allow testimony from Collins' expert witness was an abuse of discretion. The issue was 
whether the Center owed Collins a duty to reasonably protect her from injury in light of 
her seizures, her recent seizure fall injury, and her preference to swing very high on the 
Center's open swings. Collins put at issue the Center's risk management principles that 
were in place to protect its residents.13 Collins' expert witness, Dr. Lewis William 
Mustard, was qualified to testify as to the standard of care owed by the Center to Collins. 
In Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329, 1337 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court held that 
a police officer could testify as an expert witness in accident reconstruction, even though 
13
 To the extent that the district court failed to view this case as a facility negligence 
case, and refused to admit testimony from a qualified expert in hospital risk management, it is also 
a misapplication of law and is an abuse of discretion. See, discussion supra, this section, Part 
n.A. 
44 
he had limited training in accident reconstruction. The Court found that the officer's 
years of experience in accident investigation qualified him to provide expert testimony. 
Id. Relying on Utah R. Evid. 702, the Court stated that "formal training is not a 
prerequisite to giving expert testimony, and a witness may qualify as an expert by virtue 
of his experience or training." Id. (citations omitted). Similarly, Dr. Mustard's 
experience and training qualified him to provide expert testimony. 
Dr. Mustard's broad experience and numerous credentials qualified him to testify 
as an expert. Dr. Mustard holds a Ph.D in Health administration, among his many 
degrees and certifications. Facts Tf42. Dr. Mustard also taught numerous courses and 
seminars in the areas of health care management and administration, as an adjunct 
professor. Id. Dr. Mustard had twenty-five years of professional experience in the area 
of hospital administration. Id. Dr. Mustard served as an administrator over an 
intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded - the same type of facility as the 
Center. Id. Dr. Mustard specifically dealt with risk management and safety issues at that 
facility. Id.; cf., the district court's conclusion that "[Dr. Mustard's] management health 
care facilities experience has been by and large in institutions . . . that did not have as 
their additional burden dealing with those people who are severely handicapped or 
developmentally disabled or mentally retarded."14 Tr. at 294; Aplt. App. at 102. Dr. 
14
 This conclusion makes little sense when there was no evidence to suggest that 
Collins' mental retardation affected any aspect of her seizure activity. The risks of injuries from 
falling due to seizures applies to all seizure victims, not just retarded seizure victims. Collins' 
inability to "make decisions concerning her safety" illustrates the special relationship between 
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Mustard also managed nursing homes and a retirement care center in the area of patient 
care management. Facts [^42. Dr. Mustard has also testified in several facility negligence 
cases similar to Collins' case. Facts Tf42; cf, the district court's conclusion that, "[T]he 
focus of [Dr. Mustard's] expertise in the area of risk management, I see as something 
quite different and distinct from the risks inherent in providing health care facilities and 
maintenance in [the Center]."15 In short, Dr. Mustard's credentials and relevant 
experience qualified him to testify as an expert about the duty of care that the Center 
owed to Collins. 
Dr. Mustard's testimony would have helped the jury because he would have 
testified that the Center had the duty to reasonably protect Collins by considering the risk 
to Collins if she were permitted to swing on the open swings and seizured. Dr. Mustard 
was prepared to testify that the Center had the duty to apply its own policies, and to 
recognize the risks and safety issues in connection with Collins' increased seizures. Facts 
1J43. Dr. Mustard would have testified that the Center should have developed safe 
recreation alternatives, and discussed with the treatment team. Id.; and Tr. at 287-88; 
Aplt. App. at 99-100. Finally, Dr. Mustard would have testified that the Center's duty of 
Collins and the Center, see discussion supra, at Part IC, and underscores the importance of the 
Center's duty to consider the risks of injury to Collins of permitting her to swing in open swings. 
15
 Apparently, the district court concluded that risk management and the prevention 
of foreseeable accidents was not at issue in Collins' case. It is difficult to divine what other "risks 
inherent in providing health care facilities" could be at issue in this case, where no professional 
malpractice was alleged. If this Court finds that risk management and the prevention of 
foreseeable accidents was at issue, it must reverse because the district court misapplied the law. 
See discussion supra this section at Part EL A. 
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care was similar to the duty owed to other residents in similar facilities in other States. 
Facts 1f43. The district court should have permitted Dr. Mustard to testify as an expert 
about risk management at comparable facilities. 
This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict because its failure to 
permit testimony from Dr. Mustard was an abuse of discretion. Dr. Mustard was 
qualified to testify as an expert, and his testimony should have been admitted, with the 
Center's objections going to the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony. Dr. 
Mustard was qualified to testify because his testimony would have helped the jury 
understand the facts and evidence of Collins' case. This Court should therefore reverse 
the district court, and remand this case for a new trial. 
47 
CONCLUSION 
This Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict for the Center. 
Collins' case could be easily understood by lay jurors without expert testimony. The 
facts showed that the Center had a duty to comprehensively care for Collins, and 
reasonably protect her from seizure injuries - as it had for years - due to her vulnerability 
and inability to recognize hazards. This created a special relationship between the Center 
and Collins. The facts showed that the Center also owed a duty to reasonably protect 
Collins because of its own policies, from Collins' IHP, and by application of common 
sense to Collins' circumstances. The facts also show that the Center breached its duty to 
Collins by failing to even consider the risk of serious injury to Collins if she seizured and 
fell from the Center's open swings - let alone take any action to reasonably protect 
Collins from undisputedly foreseeable injuries. The jury should have had the opportunity 
to determine whether the Center breached its duty to Collins in light of the evidence 
presented at trial. For these reasons, this Court must reverse the district court, and 
remand this case for a new trial. 
This Court must also reverse the district court's refusal to permit Dr. Mustard to 
testify as to the standard of care. For the reasons set forth above, the district court abused 
its discretion because it either misapplied the law, or simply failed to let a qualified 
expert witness testify. This Court must therefore remand this case to the district court for 
a new trial. 
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